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INTRODUCTION

Control of developed water is a conservation, economic, and water
quality issue, but more fundamentally, it is a property rights issue.
Developed water initially was defined as new water added to a watercourse by reason of artificial work, which normally would not be
available in the stream absent the efforts of the developer.1 This classical definition has been expanded to include any water which has been
lawfully diverted and made available for fruitful purposes by the expenditure of money and labor of the appropriator.2 With improved
water conservation and management techniques, strengthened water
quality standards, and a progressively limited supply of state water
available for new appropriation, reclaimed or developed water, especially treated municipal effluent, will become a significant water supply source.
Subject primarily to water quality concerns, appropriators in Texas
traditionally have assumed the right to control the disposition of their
developed water. This assumed right is now challenged by agency
rules which seek to retroactively impose administrative authority over
an appropriator's ability to recycle and reuse its developed water.
Legislation to resolve unanswered jurisdictional and constitutional
questions regarding the use and ultimate disposition of developed
water was considered and defeated during the 1985 legislative session.
As a result, an appropriator's right to control and beneficially use his
developed water, especially his power to contract with others as to its
disposition, remains problematical.

II.
A.

DEFINITIONAL AND LEGAL CONCEPTS
OF DEVELOPED WATER

Definitional Overlap

Water upon diversion and application to a beneficial use is removed
from the supply of water generally considered available for appropriation by others. Stated differently, use by one defeats the claims of all

others to that water. When a water user reclaims that part used but
not consumed, he develops a new supply of water. Thus the category
of developed water generally may encompass waters described as
1. See W. HUTCHINS, TEXAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 541 (1961).
2. See Ide v. United States, 263 U.S. 497, 506 (1924); Harrell v. F. H. Vahlsing, Inc., 248
S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol17/iss4/3

2

Booth: Ownership of Developed Water: A Property Right Threatened.

1986]

SOWNERSHIP OF DEVELOPED WA TER

1183

drainage, seepage, return water, or wastewater, including municipal
effluent, that is reclaimed.
Other related terms need to be distinguished, for in this area it
helps to understand what reclaimed water is not. It is not surplus
water. Surplus water is that amount of water over and above what is
actually needed for use.4 Water diverted for the purpose of pushing
useable water through gravity flow irrigation systems can be considered surplus water. Reclaimed water is not salvaged water. "Salvaged waters are parts of a particular stream or other water supply
that have been lost, as far as beneficial use is concerned, to any of the
established users, but are saved from further loss from the supply by
artificial means and so are made available for use." 5 Salvaged water
generally is treated similarly to developed water in that in both instances the person who makes such water available is entitled to its
use. 6 The key distinction between these concepts and reclaimed, developed water is that reclaimed water has been once beneficially
applied.
The immediate purpose of water reclamation is to secure the availability of water for subsequent use. Recycling water has long been a
common practice in process industries. Subsequent use of sewage effluent for irrigation, cooling, and process water also is well established.7 Although "reuse" often is applied to all forms of subsequent
3. See W. HUTCHINS, TEXAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 541-42 (1961); Clark, Background and Trends in Water Salvage Law, 15 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 421, 436-38 (1969).

4. See Tex. Water Comm'n, 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 301.71 (Hart 1986) (surplus water
is water taken from any source in excess of needs and not used beneficially for the purpose
authorized by law); Tex. Water Comm'n, 11 Tex. Reg. 255 (1986) (prop. to be codified at 31
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 297.46).

5. 2 W.
(1974).

HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 565

6. See id. at 565-66; see also Comment, Water Saved or Water Lost: The Consequences of
Individual Conservation Measures in the Appropriation States, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV.

434, 436-41 (1976). But cf Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton
Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1323-24 (Colo. 1975) (making salvaged water subject to call of
prior appropriators). See generally Clark, Background and Trends in Water Salvage Law, 15

ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 421 (1969) (discussing water salvage); Pring & Tomb, License to
Waste: Legal Barriersto Conservation and Efficient Use of Water in the West, 25 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 25-26 to -28 (1979) (briefly describing the legal hurdles facing water

salvagers).
7. TEXAS DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, 2 WATER FOR TEXAS: TECHNICAL APPENDIX

11-18 (1984). In the pulp and paper industry for example, water is used without additional
treatment in different stages of processing. Wastewater is frequently used for irrigation and for
cooling electric power generators.
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use, the term best describes succeeding uses which are the same as
those originally made. A city reuses water when it collects its sewage
effluent, treats it, and reintroduces it into the municipal watersystem.
Successive use best describes subsequent applications of developed
water for qualitatively different purposes, such as when a municipality
sells its effluent for agricultural or industrial purposes.' A third type
of reuse, involving the exchange value of water, is sometimes
recognized.9
B.

Legal Rights in the Use of Developed Water
1. Basic Property Ownership Concepts

State ownership of water flowing in streams and rivers is the foundation of western water law and is expressed in different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, the waters of the ordinary flow and
underflow of the rivers and natural streams in Texas, stormwater,
floodwater, and rainwater are the property of the state, to be held in
trust for the use and benefit of all the people. '0 The corpus of water
which flows in water courses has also been described as being in the
"negative community," the "common," or the property of the public,
or as in Utah, "nobody's property."" The corpus of water, therefore,
cannot be privately owned while in its natural condition. 2
This is not to say that there can be no private rights of property in
water while it is still flowing. The right to appropriate state water in
Texas for example, when acquired in the manner provided in the
Water Code and as evidence by a permit, constitutes a usufructory
8. See Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144, 147 (Colo. 1973).
9. Recycling also includes the situation where City A sells raw water to City B on the
condition that City B return its treated effluent to City A's reservoir. Wilson, The Effect of
Recyling on Water Use and Legal Problems of Re-Allocation, PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON FUTURE WATER USE IN TEXAS 129 (Texas A & M University 1976). The situation
should also be considered where irrigators owning senior rights allow municipalities a first use
and receive in return treated effluent such that "potential pollutants take on measurable value
in the production of agricultural products." Vranesh, Water Planningfor Municipalities, 24
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 865, 873 (1978).
10. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
11. See, e.g., Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Resource & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 653
(Utah 1937) (water while flowing naturally in the stream "must of necessity continue common
by law of nature and therefore is 'nobody's property' "); 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS
LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 140 (1974); 1 S.WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES § 63, at 145-46 (1911).
12. See Kirk v. State Bd. of Irrigation, 134 N.W. 167, 168 (Neb. 1912) (running water is
publicijuris- the property of the public).
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right to the water, which is itself characterized as a property right.13
Although it is a well-established principle of western water law that
the holder of a permit to divert and use state water acquires no specific ownership interest in the corpus of the water prior to diversion,
he does have a right of possession and use exercisable after diversion.
Although a matured appropriative right is a vested right, a permit
authorizing the appropriation of state water is merely a license evidencing the holder's intent to divert and use state water. 14 No right to
appropriate state water is perfected until water has been beneficially
used for a purpose specified in the permit.1 5 That is, issuance of the
permit absent actual beneficial use of water does not confer on the
holder any proprietary interest in the corpus of the water. 16 The usufructuary interest evidenced by the permit however, is a real property
right which is subject to ownership, disposition, and litigation as is
any other form of private property.17
In prescribing the manner in which a private usufructuary right in
state water may be obtained, states universally impose limitations on
its exercise. Most commonly, diverted water must be applied to beneficial use, be in actual physical possession, 18 and not be taken in such a
way that its use impairs the right of senior and superior appropriators.1 9 These conditions shape the proprietary interest an appropriator has in water after it is diverted and separated from the source of
supply. These conditions are also enunciated at the time a permit is
granted.
Qualified by whatever conditions are stated in the permit, an appropriator receives a usufructuary right to take water. Upon exercise of

13. See Clark v. Briscoe Irrigation Co., 200 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1974, no writ); I W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES

152 (1974) (valuable property right).
14. See Motl v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 124, 286 S.W. 458, 475 (1926).
15. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.026 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
16. See Mot] v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 124, 286 S.W. 458, 474 (1926); South Texas Water Co.
v. Bieri, 247 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. See Lakeside Irrigation Co. v. Markham Irrigation Co., 16 Tex. 65, 75, 285 S.W. 593,
596 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, opinion adopted).
18. This second common requirement has been eroded to the extent that some states have
begun to recognize appropriation for instream uses. See generally Huffman, Instream Water
Uses: Public and PrivateAlternative, WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BuREAUCRACY, & THE ENVIRONMENT 249 (1983).

19. See California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816,
820, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (1979); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Amity Mutual Irrigation Co., 688
P.2d 1110, 1114-15 (Colo. 1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-131(B) (Supp. 1984-85).
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that right, it is generally held that the appropriator receives a personal
property interest in the water actually taken.2" Thus, once state water
is lawfully diverted and applied to beneficial use, the general rule in
the western states is that the appropriator acquires ownership of the
particles of water. As noted by the Washington Supreme Court in
Madison v. McNeil,2 "[water, after it has been diverted from a natural stream and taken into a reservoir and distributing pipes, takes the
character of personal property, the ownership of which rests in the
appropriator. ... "22 Idaho provides private ownership of the corpus
of water after diversion, but qualifies that ownership with the requirement of beneficial use.2"
There are notable exceptions. Arizona for example provides that
"[w]ater, being public property in a running stream, continues to be
public property even when diverted for beneficial uses, and remains
such until actually applied to such uses."' 24 Although Arizona retains
ownership of the corpus of water, the appropriator is considered to be
the lawful custodian of the diverted water.2
In all of the western states, proprietary rights in water actually diverted are lost when that water is abandoned to a public watercourse,
and the abandoned water once again becomes public property subject
to appropriation. 6 The right to recapture water that has not yet left
20. See Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (Colo. 1951); see also

1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 18 (1911) (the individual particles of
water diverted into an artificial structure of waterworks become private property, having as
particles, the characteristics of personal property). But see Fudicar v. East Riverside Irrigation
Dist., 41 P. 1024, 1026, 109 Cal. 29, 36 (1895) (water, while flowing in a canal or pipe which is
real property, is also real property); Mudge v. Hughes, 212 S.W. 819, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.1919, no writ) (water, while in canals for irrigation purposes, is real property); 2 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 149-51 (1974) (describing

California rule that water does not become personalty as soon as it is diverted, but retains its
character as realty until the water is delivered to the consumer).
21. 19 P.2d 97 (Wash. 1933).
22. Id. at 98.
23. See Glaven v. Solmon River Canal Co., 258 P. 532, 534 (Idaho 1927).
24. Slosser v. Salt River Valley Canal Co., 65 P. 332, 336 (Ariz. 1901).
25. Although one making a lawful diversion from a public stream does not become an
owner of the corpus, he does become the lawful custodian of the diverted water with any
appurtenant rights and responsibilities. See id. at 336; see also Gould v. Maricopa Canal Co.,
76 P. 598, 601 (Ariz. 1904); 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 145 (1974).

26. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 637 (1945); Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation
Dist., 90 P.2d 58, 61, 13 Cal. 2d 343, 345 (1939); Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond
Packing Co., 236 P. 764, 773 (Wyo. 1925).
A different situation arises when the release is planned as part of a delivery system. See City
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the land of its application cannot, however, be lost by abandonment.
The holder of a permit to appropriate water in Texas possesses a
usufructuary right to use the water. The permit holder's grant of a
right to use water, as opposed to title to the corpus of water, is recog-

nized as a valuable property right which cannot be taken without
compensation and due process of law.2 7 It is at the point when water

is lawfully diverted that the nature of the proprietary interest in that
water becomes unclear.
Wells Hutchins suggested, based upon Lakeside Irrigation Co. v.

Markham Irrigation Co., 28 that water in Texas once "severed from the
natural resource and reduced to physical possession" loses its charac-

ter as state water and becomes the private property of the appropriator.29 Lakeside Irrigation involved an irrigator's right under his grant
from the state to have water flow into his canals and ditches free from

upstream interference. 3° The Commission of Appeals noted that
although the downstream irrigation company's interest in the water
was in the nature of an incorporeal hereditament, the company had
the right to have the water flow into his ditches, but that the company
"did not own the corpus of the water until it shall enter its ditch."3
Hutchins used this quoted language to infer that once water enters the
ditch, its appropriator has title to the particles, or corpus of that
water.
In 1956 the Galveston Court of Appeals in South Texas Water Co.

v. Bieri,3 2 took a contrary view, holding that an appropriator of water
of Los Angeles v. Glendale, 142 P.2d 289, 294, 23 Cal. 2d 76, 78 (1943). The California
Supreme Court stated:
Plaintiff had a prior right to the use of the water.... It did not abandon that right when
it spread the water for the purpose of economical transporation and storage ... Early in
the history of the state, this court recognized the advantage of permitting the use of natural surface facilities, stream beds, dry canyons and the like, for the transporation of
water....
Id. at 294, 23 Cal. 2d at 78.
27. See Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 649-50 (Tex. 1971);
Board of Water Eng'rs v. McKnight, 11 Tex. 82, 91, 229 S.W.301, 304 (1921); Board of Water
Eng'rs v. Slaughter, 382 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
28. 285 S.W. 593 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, opinion adopted).
29. See W. HUTCHINS, TEXAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 80 (1961).

30. See Lakeside Irrigation Co. v. Markham Irrigation Co., 285 S.W. 593, 593 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1926, opinion adopted).
31. See id. at 597.
32. 247 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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from a public stream does not acquire ownership of the corpus of the
water but only the right to use the water for the purposes specified in
the permit.33 In Bieri, the South Texas Water Company had a permit
to appropriate water to irrigate a specific tract of land. 34 Bieri owned
land outside this permit area and irrigated his land with water from a
public stream containing seepage water, run-off, and drainage water
originating from the permit area. The water company argued that
Bieri owed the company for the water obtained from the stream based
upon an oral agreement, conversion, and quantum meruit a5 The
court held that there was insufficient evidence that the water company
had exercised any lawful right or control in the drainage water
outside its permit area, or that the water was subject to the water
company's control or possession. 36 The court noted that under state
law, an "appropriator of water from a public stream does not acquire
the ownership or corpus of the water but merely acquires the right to
the use thereof for
the purposes set forth in the permit under which he
'3 7
appropriates.
The Texas Supreme Court, in Texas Water Rights Commission v.
Wright,38 sustained the validity of the cancellation statutes and held
that an appropriator receives only a right to use state water for beneficial purposes. The state, it said, is at all times the owner of the corpus
of the water, "subject only to the exhaustion of the corpus as a result
of beneficial use."' 39 The Wright court was presented with issues involving an appropriator's rights in water which had not been beneficially used. 4° The facts in Bieri clearly established that the water in
that case, although beneficially used, was abandoned and was no
longer under the possession and control of the appropriator.4" Since
neither case involved a situation where an appropriator sought to re33. See id. at 272.
34. See id. at 269.
35. See id. at 270.

36. See id. at 270.
37. Id. at 272.
38. 464 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1971).
39. See id. at 647.
40. The permits subject to cancellation in Wright were used in conformity with statutory
requirements until 1954, when a flood destroyed the diversion facilities. From that time until
1967 water was not beneficially used. See id. at 644.
41. See South Texas Water Co. v. Bieri, 247 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court in Bieri held that there was no evidence that the South

Texas Water Company exercised any control of its drainage water. See id. at 273.
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use water, an appropriator's interest in water after it has been diverted
and beneficially used must be analyzed in view of the doctrine of developed water.
2.

Doctrine of Developed Water

As mentioned, the doctrine of developed water provides that one
who makes available a supply of water that was not previously available is entitled to its use as long as its operations do not interfere with
the prior right of others. The developed water doctrine evolved
largely from conflicting claims to irrigation wastewater. 4 2 Because irrigation use is only partially consumptive, substantial quantities of
seepage and run-off water can be collected in drainage ditches and
reused on the same land or sold for further use elsewhere. Conflicts
arose when others made claim to wastewater so collected or "developed" by the original appropriator. In Ide v. United States,43 the
United States Supreme Court noted the general rule protecting the
water developer in such a situation:
One, who by the expenditure of money and labor diverts appropriated
water from a stream, and thus makes it available for fruitful purposes, is
entitled to its exclusive control so long as he is able and willing to apply
it to beneficial uses, and such right extends to what is commonly known
as wastage from surface run-off and deep percolation, necessarily incident to practical irrigation. Considerations of both public policy and
natural justice strongly support such a rule.'
The act of a municipality or other political subdivision in capturing
and treating municipal sewage effluent after the initial beneficial use is
analogous to the act of an irrigator who captures and uses his drainage water, and both situations fit within the description of developed
water. In the latter case, water is diverted from a watercourse and put
to beneficial use for the irrigation of land. Some water escapes from
the canals or other carrying facilities, and some flows from the surface
or seeps through the subsurface without being consumed and is captured by drainage ditches. The water, collected by the artificial works
of man, is developed water which is available for use by the appropri-

42. See 2 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 565-67
(1974).
43. 263 U.S. 497 (1923).
44. Id. at 506 (quoting United States v. Haga, 276 F. 41, 43 (S.D. Idaho 1921)).
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ator who, through the expenditure of money and labor, has made the
water available for further use.
In the case of a municipal water supply, water is diverted, treated,
and delivered to the customers of a city. When that city operates a
sewage collection and treatment system, it expends money and labor
to construct a system to collect water which has not been consumed
as a result of its customers' uses. The water is then treated, and in the
form of effluent, can be reused instead of being discharged into a watercourse. The municipality has therefore developed a new source of
supply which otherwise would not have been present absent the expenditure for capturing and treating sewage effluent. 4 5
a.

Doctrine of Developed Water in the Western States

Although the consensus opinion in the western states is that so long
as an appropriator has dominion over his used water he can recapture
it and make beneficial reuse of it, the states' treatments of developed
water have not followed a consistent pattern. An Arizona court recognized in 1924 a right in persons who recover drainage waters put
into the ground by artificial irrigation to dispose of such waters by
sale or otherwise.4 6 Such waters are not naturally in the ground, the
court reasoned, and therefore are not subject to appropriation under
state law. 47 Conversely, where an appropriator chooses not to recapture its developed water, a lower landowner may use the water that
flows through his land, but he does not thereby earn a vested right in
the continuance of that flow. The initial user retains the right to deprive the lower user of the developed water entirely, either by preventing waste, or by recapturing and using any waste or surplus water. 48
45. The Colorado Supreme Court has determined, however, that to turn sewage effluent
back into the river will not increase the rivei's flow above what it would have been had the
water not been diverted; therefore, it is not developed water. See Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co.
v. City of Trinidad, 203 P. 681, 683 (Colo. 1922).
46. See Brewster v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 229 P. 929, 934 (Ariz. 1924).
Brewster was decided under a statutory formulation almost identical to the present one which
provides that the waters of all sources, including waste and surplus water belong to the public
and are subject to appropriation and beneficial use. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-131A
(Supp. 1984-85).
47. See Brewster v. Salt River Valley Water User's Ass'n, 229 P. 929, 934 (Ariz. 1924).
48. See Lambeye v. Garcia, 157 P. 977, 979 (Ariz. 1916) (where appropriator entered into
an association with others, whereby overflow caught and collected for benefit of all association
members, wastewater question is eliminated, and likewise the former interceptor's claimed
rights are extinguished); compare Wedgworth v. Wedgworth, 181 P. 952, 954 (Ariz. 1919)
("surplus water" not subject to prior appropriation for any use so that any property right is

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol17/iss4/3

10

Booth: Ownership of Developed Water: A Property Right Threatened.

1986]

OWNERSHIP OF DEVELOPED WA TER

1191

California has several statutes aimed at expanding the use of developed water,49 although there remains judicial precedent to protect
downstream users of effluent return flow.5 0 The rules are different
when the return flows originate from imported or foreign waters.
Water importers are not required to maintain discharged flows even
when failure to do so impairs the diversion capabilities of lower appropriators. Importers may retake the water still in their possession
at a point of drainage and make subsequent beneficial use.51 A further
distinction between imported and in-basin water was drawn in City of

Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando52 where the court found that

imported water could be recaptured even after it had commingled
with natural waters in an underground basin.53
Water in ditches constructed to collect seepage or wastewater are
available for appropriation in Idaho with the following caveat:
[Such appropriation is] subject to the right of the owner to cease wasting it, or in good faith to change the place or manner of wasting it, or to
recapture it, so long as he applies it to a beneficial use. His control is
not dependent upon continuous actual possession, and in the absence of
abandonment or forfeiture of his right to its use, he may assert his right,
which is not affected by his once having applied it to a beneficial use.54

established by such appropriation and use, but refers to water applied but not consumed in the
process of irrigation) with Salt River Valley Water User's Ass'n v. Kovacovich, 411 P.2d 201,
202 (Ariz. 1966) (water saved was appurtenant to the land for which it was appropriated and
could not be used on other lands).
49. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 460-64 (West Supp. 1985) (wastewater reuse); id.
§§ 13,550 to -,551 (water reclamation); id. §§ 13,955 to -,969 (water conservation bonds).
50. See Scott v. Fruit Growers Supply Co., 258 P.2d 1095, 1098, 202 Cal. 47, 55 (1927)
(when effluent discharged into a stream and has been appropriated downstream, upstream
users may be barred from taking actions that will diminish this return flow); see also Brown &
Weinstock, Legal Issues in Implementing Water Reuse in California,9 ECOLOGY L.J. 243, 270
(1981) (noting rights of downstream effluent appropriators).
51. See Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 90 P.2d 58, 62, 13 Cal. 2d 343, 352 (1939)
(where an artificial condition has become permanent and there has been a dedication to the
public use, or where the drainage is wantonly stopped to harm a lower party, without other
objection subsequent use may be had). But cf People v. City of Roseville, No. 49608 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Placer County, filed 1977) (California sought to restrict discretion of water importers to sell effluent to irrigators diverting water downstream from treatment plant, but case
settled without decision on the merits).
52. 537 P.2d 1250, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975).
53. See id. at 1295, 14 Cal. 3d at 260-61.
54. Sebern v. Moore, 258 P. 176, 178 (Idaho 1927); see also Hidden Springs Trout Ranch,
Inc. v. Hagerman Water Users, Inc., 619 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Idaho 1980) (no appropriator of
wastewater should be able to compel any other appropriator to continue wasting water to
benefit the former because recognition of a right in a third person to enforce the continuation
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Thus, a senior appropriator of water in Idaho retains his right to
waste and seepage water, and may recapture it, even though such
water has been used by a junior appropriator for as long as forty
years."
New Mexico includes within the definition of artificial surface waters, those collected from seepage, waste, and drainage from artificial
works such that the accumulation depends upon human acts. 6 These
artificial surface waters are primarily private and subject to beneficial
use by the owner or developer.5 In Reynolds v. City of Roswell,"5 the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that the state engineer, in granting
a permit to change the place of use of water rights, could not impose
conditions requiring Roswell to discharge sewage effluent into a river
in the same ratio and at the same locations as during a previous period. 9 In including municipal effluent in the class of artificial waters
defined above, the court stated, "[tireated sewage effluent is in the
same category as water which has drained, seeped or percolated from
a treatment plant which 'depend for their continuance upon the acts
of man.'"" The court noted cases from other jurisdictions which
hold that an appropriator has the right to reuse his wastewater; that
no other appropriator can compel him to continue the waste of water
for another's benefit; and that no appropriator has the right to rely on
the same point of discharge or return of municipal sewage effluent. 6
New Mexico's Supreme Court earlier, in considering whether injecting private drain water into an underground basin would affect the
flow of a river into which the water had previously been discharged,
held that until private water reaches public water it can be diverted

of waste will not result in more efficient uses of water); Reynolds Irrigation Dist. v. Sproat, 214
P.2d 880, 883 (Idaho 1950) (wastewater belongs to original appropriator and may be reclaimed
if put to beneficial use).
55. See Colthrop v. Mountain Home Irrigation Dist., 157 P.2d 1005, 1007-08 (Idaho
1945); see also Cantlin v. Carter, 397 P.2d 761, 766 (Idaho 1964) (prior appropriated water
remains with an appropriator unless abandoned); Thompson v. Bingham, 302 P.2d 948, 949
(Idaho 1946) ("as against original appropriator and owner, an adjoining landowner cannot

acquire a prescriptive right to waste or sewage water").
56. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-27 (1978).
57. See id. § 72-5-27; see also In re Langenegger, 326 P.2d 1098, 1100-01 (N.M. 1958).
58. 654 P.2d 537 (N.M. 1982).
59. See id. at 539.

60. Id.at 540.
61. See id. at 541 (citing Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074 (Mont.
1933) and Thayer v. City of Rawlins, 594 P.2d 95 (Wyo. 1979)).
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and disposed of as the owner sees fit.62 The state engineer therefore
had no authority to insist that this private water continue to flow into
the river.
Wyoming law recognizes that seepage and wastewater is private
water while it remains on the land from which it originates. Thus
where seepage water would naturally reach a stream if not intercepted, it is considered a part of the stream and must be permitted to
return if the owner cannot make beneficial use of such seepage.63 In
Fuss v. Franks,6' the Wyoming Supreme Court emphasized that the
right to recapture and reuse was limited to the land for which the
water was appropriated.6 5 Upon leaving that land, if the water is tributary, it again becomes subject to appropriation with the original user
having no superior rights in the water. The outcome of the case was
that a farmer who constructed a wastewater collection ditch and for
fifteen years sent his wastewater from the ditch into a highway borrow
pit for a short distance to make further use of the water on another
leased tract lost the right to reuse his collected water.6 6 The court
affirmed the state engineer's issuance of a permit for appropriation
from the borrow ditch by another landowner, relying upon the appurtenancy doctrine followed in Wyoming that stated "waters become appurtenant to the lands for which they are acquired and,
unless the statutes are followed with respect to change of use, the waters cannot be detached and assigned to other land without the loss of
'67
priority.
The effect of Fuss on a Wyoming city's right to dispose of its effluent as it sees fit is unclear. One year earlier in a narrowly drawn
opinion, the Wyoming court answered the question of whether downstream appropriators were entitled to compensation when a city
changed its point of discharge of imported waters. Thayer v. City of
Rawlins 68 held that the city has the unrestricted right to reuse, successively use, and make disposition of imported waters, that cannot be
abandoned because "[t]he water is always different from year to

62. See Reynolds v. Wiggins, 397 P.2d 469, 471 (N.M. 1964).
63. See Bower v. Big Horn Canal Ass'n, 307 P.2d 593, 602 (Wyo. 1957); Binning v.
Miller, 102 P.2d 54, 61 (Wyo. 1940).
64. 610 P.2d 17 (Wyo. 1980).
65. See id. at 20.
66. See id. at 19.
67. Id. at 20.
68. 594 P.2d 951 (Wyo. 1979).
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year."6 9 The court did not theorize with respect to any plan of complete consumption by the city, nor did it state the rule with respect to
non-imported waters.
Colorado courts have adopted the minority view, holding that municipal sewage effluent is not developed water, based on their analysis
that the water in effluent is not water which has been used for domestic purposes but is only used mechanically for the purpose of diluting
and conveying away solid matter.7" According to the Colorado
court's reasoning, the water performs a service much like water used
for hydroelectric power generation and must be returned to the
stream just as water used for power generation is returned to the
stream.
An early Colorado case held that an irrigator could not collect his
drainage water and sell it for application on other lands using a
stream bed as a carrier, even though the water was in a sense not
natural to the stream.7" The court reasoned that because these waters
would eventually reach the stream if left alone, they were tributary to
72
the stream and had been already appropriated by downstream users.
More recent Colorado courts have held that effluent containing water
imported from other basins is developed water and may be used, reused, and disposed of by the developer.7 3 Physical control of the
water is not lost upon delivery to the customer nor upon delivery for
treatment. 74 However, whether used water is originally from the basin of discharge or is imported, downstream appropriators are not
69. Id. at 955.
70. See Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad, 203 P. 681, 683 (Colo. 1922).
71. See Comstock v. Ramsey, 133 P. 1107, 1110 (Colo. 1913).
72. See id. at 1110; see also Trowel Land & Irrigation Co. v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 176 P.
292, 296 (Colo. 1918) (seepage waters returning to stream are tributary to stream and may be
diverted against prior appropriator's rights).
73. See City & County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144, 146
(Colo. 1972). At the time of the decision Colorado statutes provided that an appropriator may
make successive use of water lawfully introduced into a stream system from an unconnected
stream system, provided that the foreign water can be distinguished from the water of the
stream into which it is introduced. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106 (1974). This section
was amended in 1979 to make such right of successive use personal to the developer. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-82-106 (Supp. 1984). Developed water becomes a part of the natural
stream when it is released from the dominion of the developer. See id. § 37-82-106. The Colorado Supreme Court noted, however, that Denver would have the right of reuse, successive
use, and disposition of its developed water even without application of the statute. See City &
County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144, 147 (Colo. 1972).
74. See City & County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144, 147
(Colo. 1972).
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protected in the maintenance of return points of irrigation wastewater
or of municipal effluent absent bad faith or unreasonable conduct.7"
Federal courts have recognized the doctrine of developed water in
such cases as Ide v. United States16 and Nebraska v. Wyoming.7 7 In
Texas, a federal district court in El Paso County Water Improvement
District No. 1 v. City of El Paso, acknowledged that the first users of
project water could recover the drainage for repeated use within the
project.7 City of El Paso involved a claim by El Paso to water once
used by the Rio Grande Reclamation Project and returned to the Rio
Grande.7 9 The particular water in question, however, was waste
water because there was no further irrigation use for the water either
by the project or those previously contracting for the water. The
court said El Paso had as good a right to the water as anyone, but
only after the project was through with it."' The district court, however, discussed with approval an arrangement between the city and
the district whereby the city would substitute its discharged effluent
for direct river flow,"' but was reversed in this part of its decision
based upon the appellate court's view of certain contractual
arrangements.8 2

75. See Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal Dist. No. I v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation, 499 P.2d 1190, 1193-94 (Colo. 1972). This opinion was issued simultaneously with the
Fulton Irrigation case which recognized the right of disposition over imported waters. It is
interesting to note that when the farmers in Fulton Irrigation complained that the city should
use imported water in irrigation season giving the reclaimed water to its transferees and use inbasin water only during non-irrigation season, the court declared that such action by the city
would be arbitrary, unreasonable, and unconstitutional. The court called for legislation on the
point. See City & County of Denver v. Fulton Irrigation Ditch Co., 506 P.2d 144, 149 (Colo.
1972).
Colorado law currently recognizes that all waters in the state that are not in or tributary to a
natural stream are subject to such administration and use as the general assembly may provide:
"such nontributary waters, when released from the dominion of the user, become a part of the
natural surface stream where released, subject to water rights on such stream in the order of
their priority." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-82-101 (Supp. 1984).
76. 263 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1924) (perfector of irrigation system entitled to recapture and
utilize seepage).
77. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
78. 133 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Tex. 1955), rev'd in part, 243 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1957).
79. See id. at 923.
80. See id. at 924.
81. See id. at 925.
82. See El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. City of El Paso, 243 F.2d 927,
933 (5th Cir. 1957).
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The Texas Doctrine of Developed Water

Although the doctrine of developed water as enumerated by Texas
courts is imprecise, it appears to adhere to the traditional premise that
developed water must be under the exclusive control of the developer.
Although the legislature has declared state ownership of "the water of
the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural
stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and
the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every river, natural
stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in the State, ' '8 3 the
Texas Water Code establishes a process by which persons may acquire rights to use unappropriated state water. An appropriator's
right to take and use state water is limited by the terms of his permit
which generally state the quantity of water that may be diverted and
the purpose for which it may be taken. 4 No right to appropriate
water is perfected unless the water has been beneficially used for a
purpose stated in the original declaration of intention to appropriate
water or in the permit issued by the Texas Water Commission or one
of its predecessors.8 5 Once the condition of beneficial use for authorized purposes is satisfied, the water right is a vested property
interest.8 6
Although the rights of an appropriator to developed water have not
been litigated extensively in Texas, a strong argument can be made
that an appropriator has the right of disposition over any water he
develops. In Harrellv. F H. Vahising, Inc., 7 the La Feria Water Control and Improvement District, Cameron County No. 3, appropriated
state water under a permit from the State Board of Water Engineers
and distributed the water for irrigation purposes. 8 The district also
constructed and maintained a system of artificial drainage ditches to
collect the water it had appropriated after that water was used, as well
as some spillage, seepage, and subsurface drainage from lands through

83. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
84. See id. § 11.025 (right to use state water limited not only to amount specifically appropriated but also to amount which can be beneficially used); id. § 11.135 (permit shall specify, inter alia, use for which appropriation is to be made, description of source of supply, and
amount of water authorized to be appropriated).
85. See id. § 11.026.
86. See Clark v. Briscoe Irrigation Co., 200 S.W.2d 674, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1947, no writ).
87. 248 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
88. See id. at 764.
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which the ditches passed.8 9 F. H. Vahlsing, Inc., contracted with the
district to purchase this captured water for irrigation purposes. Harrell, who had been using water from the ditch without agreement
from La Feria, asserted a conflicting claim to use the drainage water
and a claim for loss of crops. 9°
The court was asked whether the right to use and control the water
in the drainage ditch, and therefore the power to contract as to its
disposition, was vested in the La Feria District, based upon the theory
that the supply was created or developed by the district. The court
agreed that, "as to all other persons or agencies with the possible exception of the State of Texas,... the La Feria District is possessed of
a usufructuary right in and to the waters of its North Main Drainage
Ditch under the doctrine of developed waters." 9 The court relied on
the language from Ide v. United States 92 that considerations of public
policy and natural justice strongly support awarding exclusive control
93
of developed water to the one who creates the supply.
Two years later the San Antonio Court of Appeals answered the
issue raised by Harrellas to the authority of the state to grant permits
to use developed water. In Guelker v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement District No. 6,9 the Hidalgo County District sought to enjoin certain landowners from diverting water from drainage ditches
located within the territorial boundaries of the Donna Irrigation District, which was a separate district and not a party to the suit. 95 The
Donna Irrigation District had contracted with the Hidalgo County
Water Improvement District No. 2, referred to as the San Juan District, to construct and maintain a sufficient drainage system to connect with the drainage system of the San Juan District and to remove
the drainage water from that district. The Donna District then sold
to J. C. Engleman, Jr., all of the water which entered its drainage
system, whether from its territory, or from the San Juan District. Hi89. See id. at 764.
90. See id. at 764.
91. Id. at 768. The "possible exception" the Harrellcourt noted referred to the fact that
the district had voluntarily sought and obtained a state permit to reappropriate the water from
its ditches. That fact was not controlling, however, as the court described it as merely having
"fortified" the claims based on the doctrine of developed waters. See id. at 768.
92. 263 U.S. 497 (1923) (quoting United States v. Haga, 276 F. 41, 43 (S.D. Idaho 1921)).
93. See Harrell v. F. H. Vahlsing, Inc., 248 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1932, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. 269 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
95. See id. at 552-53.
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dalgo County Water Improvement District No.9 66 claimed the drainage water as a successor under these contracts.
The court ruled that the Donna District had the usufructuary right
to the waters flowing in its main drains.9 7 The district had the power
to sell this usufructuary right, consistent with public policy; therefore,
the appellee Hidalgo District No. 6, under contracts with Donna District, had become the owner of the water right to the exclusion of
appellant landowners "for all time to come."'9 8 As to state regulation
of the drainage water, the court said:
The permits which appellee acquired from the State Board of Water
Engineers are immaterial to any issue here raised. The waters entering
and flowing in these drainage ditches were developed or captured waters, and the State Board of Water Engineers had no jurisdiction to issue a permit controlling their use.99
An irrigation permit, in addition to stating a specific use, must also
describe the land to be irrigated."° State authorization is required to
change the place of irrigation. 10 1 In both Vahising, Inc. and Guelker,
reclaimed water was sold for use outside the respective districts'
boundaries-presumably an area not described in the permits. The
precedential value of these cases for the premise that a permit limits
only the initial use of water may be made suspect by the fact that in
both instances the water developer was a political subdivision endowed with specific powers. One of the statutory powers at the time
of the decisions provided:
Any Irrigation Water Improvement District now existing or hereafter
to be created may sell any surplus water it may have, or have conserved,
96. See id. at 552-53.
97. See id. at 553.
98. See id. at 553.
99. Id. at 555. But see Scoggins v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 15,
264 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (although the court
assumed that the proprietary or usufructuary right to drainage water belonged to the owners
of the ditch, as between others holding permits from the state to appropriate from the ditch,
the court adjudicated their rights on the priority of their permits). See generally W. HUTCHINS, TEXAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 543-44 (1961).
100. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.135(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986) (providing that "[i]f
the appropriation is for irrigation, the commission shall also place in the permit a description
and statement of the approximate area of the land to be irrigated"). Statutes pertaining to
water have included similar language since 1913. E.g., Act of April 9, 1913, ch. 171, 1913 Tex.
Gen. Laws 358.
101. See Clark v. Briscoe Irrigation Co., 200 S.W.2d 674, 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1947, no writ).
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to lands in the same vicinity, for the purposes of irrigation, domestic or
commercial uses; and any such District may contract to pump or deliver, for such purpose, to lands in the same vicinity of such Districts
water which such lands may be entitled to appropriate under permit
from the Board of Water Engineers of the State of Texas, upon such
terms. .. 2

A similar provision was made for Water Control and Improvement
Districts." 3 A reading of Vahising, Inc. and Guelker shows that the
district's special powers were not made a basis for either decision.
Indeed, these powers were not mentioned. The Guelker court went so
far as to refuse to recognize any authority in the governing water
agency to direct the use of developed water.
Whether an appropriator's rights in his developed water is characterized as private ownership or as a usufructuary right, it is clear that
the developer possesses a significant interest in the use and disposition
of the water. In granting permits to appropriate state water, the state
relinquishes many of the attributes of ownership, and only retains
those which are specified in the permit, and which are supplied by the
Texas Constitution, statutes, and administrative regulations in effect
at the time the permit is granted. For example, the state relinquishes
the right of exclusive use and control of state water to the permitee,
and the state cannot grant additional permits to use the water, either
before or after diversion and use, until the permit is cancelled.' °4
An appropriator receives, however, only the right to use the water
for beneficial and nonwasteful purposes."°5 Additionally, pursuant to
its police power, the state retains authority to regulate the quality of
the used water which is discharged. 0 6 Further, an appropriator has
no right to continued nonuse-he may willfully abandon his right to
divert and use state water' °7 or the state may cancel, in whole or in
102. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7792 (Vernon 1925), codified in TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 55.197 (Vernon 1986).
103. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7880-138 (Vernon 1925), codified in TEX.

WATER CODE ANN. § 51.188 (Vernon 1986).
104. See Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d
873, 876 (Tex. 1984) (water authorized to be diverted by permit not subject to additional
appropriation until existing permit cancelled, forfeited, or otherwise invalidated).
105. See Tex. Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. 1971).
106. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.001 et seq. (Vernon Supp. 1986) (relating to
water quality control and authority of Texas Water Commission to issue waste discharge
permits).

107. See id. § 11.030 (if any lawful appropriation of state water willfully abandoned for
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part, his permit when the water is not beneficially used.10
Although the right to use state water is limited to the amount of
water which is or can be beneficially used for the purposes stated in
the permit, there is no provision in the Water Code requiring diverted
water which has been beneficially used, but not consumed as a result
of such use, to be returned to the source of supply. Water Code section 11.046 requires only that surplus water be returned to the stream
from which it was taken, and even then, the requirement applies only
if the water can be returned by gravity flow and if it is reasonably
practicable to do so.' °9 Sewage effluent is not surplus water, but is
used water and is not required by statute to be returned to the stream
of origin.1 10 An applicant for a water permit is not required by statute
to estimate return flow or designate a return point."'1 With the narrow exception pertaining to surplus water then, the "grant" of water
from the state is complete upon the water's application to beneficial
use.
Based upon Harrellv. F. H. Vahising, Inc. and Guelker v. Hidalgo
County Water Improvement DistrictNo. 6, an appropriator should retain exclusive control over the use and disposition of his developed
water, subject only to the state's police power and any conditions imposed by the permit, statutes, and administrative rules in existence at
the time the permit was issued. In other states, rights in developed
water primarily have been based upon the conclusion that water diverted and used pursuant to a valid authorization from the state becomes the private property of the user. 1 12 This premise was
recognized in dicta in Lakeside IrrigationCo. v. Markham Irrigation
Co.113 Arguably however, the supreme court in Texas Water Rights

three successive years, the right to use the water forfeited and again subject to appropriation);
see also City of Corpus Christi v. Nueces County Water Improvement Dist. No. 3, 540 S.W.2d
357, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (party asserting abandonment of a water right must show willful intent to abandon).
108. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

§

11.146 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (forfeiture of permit

for failure to begin construction within the time specified in the permit); id. §§ 11.171 to -. 186
(cancellation of permits and certified filings for ten consecutive years nonuse).
109. See id. § 11.046.
110. See Halsell v. Texas Water Comm'n, 380 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
111. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.124, -. 125 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
112. See supra nn. 18-25 and accompanying text.
113. 116 Tex. 65, 74, 285 S.W. 593, 596 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, opinion adopted); see
also supra nn.28-31 and accompanying text.
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Commission v. Wright 114 held to the contrary when it declared ownership of state water existed "at all times." The Wright decision should
be viewed, however, in the context of the facts and arguments
presented to the court.
Prior to the Wright decision, it was widely believed that grants of
water rights were grants of vested rights which created an ownership
interest of the water in the permittee. 11 5 Indeed, Justice McClendon
in Clark v. Briscoe Irrigation Co. 116 reviewed the historical and legal
basis of the state's water laws at that time and held that there was no
question that a perfected water right constituted a "vested interest in
or title to the use of water thereby appropriated."' 1 7 In Wright, however, the court concluded that the right one obtains by a water permit,
although vested, is a right of use limited to beneficial and non-wasteful purposes." 8 The water covered by the permits in question was not
being beneficially used, hence the state was in fact the owner of the
water at all relevant times. The Wright decision, therefore, is not in
conflict with the doctrine of developed water as applied in Vahising
and Guelker, or the conclusion regarding private ownership rights in
developed water as stated in Lakeside Irrigation.
This is not to say that the state cannot impose conditions upon the
use of developed water at the time the original permit is granted. The
state water agency, beginning with Permit No. 1945 issued in 1960,
has sometimes provided in permits that all water beneficially used, but
not consumed, be returned to the supply source. Basic concepts of
property law consistently have recognized the right of an owner to
convey his property subject to various terms and conditions. These
conditions and limitations should not be applied retroactively, however, and it is submitted that restrictions on the use of developed
water to be effective must have been in existence at the time the permit to appropriate state water was issued.

114. 464 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. 1971).
115. See id. at 647 (noting State v. Board of Water Eng's v. Slaughter, 382 S.W.2d 111

(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964 writ ref'd n.r.e.); State v. Harrison, 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.
1966); City of Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Reeves v. Pecos County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 299 S.W.224 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1927, holding approved)).
116. 200 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, no writ).

117. Id. at 679.
118. See Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. 1971).
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TEXAS WATER COMMISSION REGULATION OF USE OF
DEVELOPED WATER

Regulatory Scheme

The Texas Water Commission is the state agency which has been
delegated responsibility for implementing the Texas Constitution and
statutes relative to the state's water resources." 9 The Commission
has general jurisdiction over the issuance of water rights and water
quality permits,120 and may perform any acts expressed or implied by
the Water Code which are "necessary and convenient" to the exercise
of its delegated powers.' 2
The Commission and its predecessor agencies have used this authority to exert control over water reuse by administrative rule. One
such rule states that all return and surplus water must be returned to
the water supply or water course at the points stated in the permit or
amendatory order. 22 This requirement could be read to apply only
when a return point has been specified. The rule also provides, however, that the right to use water is limited to the purposes stated in the
permit and explains that if an entity uses state water authorized for
municipal purpose, it may not use or sell the effluent for any other
119. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.012 (Vernon Supp. 1986). In 1977 the Texas
Water Rights Commission, the Texas Water Development Board, and the Texas Water Quality Board were abolished and merged into the Texas Department of Water Resources. See
Law of June 16, 1977, ch. 870, § 9, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2207, 2343. The 1977 Act also
provided for a formal separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of the
Department of Water Resources, which were vested in the Texas Water Development Board,
the executive director, and the Texas Water Commission. See id. § 1, at 2208 (formerly codified at TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.012 (Vernon Supp. 1985)), repealed by Act of June 15,
1985, ch. 795, § 1.001, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 5743, 5989 (Vernon). The Texas Department of Water Resources was reorganized into the Texas Water Commission and the Texas
Water Development Board. See Law of June 15, 1985, ch. 795, § 10.004, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 5743, 6008 (Vernon). The Texas Water Commission is now the state agency delegated
primary responsibility for implementing the Texas Constitution and statutes relating to water.
See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.012 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The Texas Water Development
Board is the state agency primarily responsible for water planning and water financing. See id.
§ 5.012.
120. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.013 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
121. See id. § 5.102(a).
122. See Tex. Water Comm'n, 10 Tex. Reg. 3472 (1985), renewed, 10 Tex. Reg. 4985
(1985) (emerg. rule affecting 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 303.154) (expired March 3, 1986).
A new emergency rule relating to return and surplus waters became effective March 3, 1986.
See Tex. Water Comm'n, II Tex. Reg. 1175 (1986) (prop. to be codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 297.45) (expires July 1, 1986). This rule is substantially the same as that cited above
except for the omission of reference to the policy of discharge of treated wastewater.
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purpose without first obtaining a new or modified permit from the
Commission.1 2 1 Presumably, the requirement to obtain a new or
modified permit applies even where return of used water was never
stipulated. By revision of that rule, first effective in March 1985, application of sewage effluent upon land sites is considered municipal
use when conducted in specified circumstances aimed primarily at
water quality or where the application is to a landscaped area owned
by the sewage system permittee. 24 A simultaneous change to Rule
303.155 by implication included effluent within the category of "state
water." 125
A policy to "encourage the proper treatment and discharge of wastewater into state waters for subsequent beneficial reuse" was also announced at the same time. 26 Rule 341.140 requires the Water
Commission, when reviewing water quality permit applications that
do not contemplate discharge into state waters, to consider the effect
that various disposal methods will have on water use and water planning, including the effect on availability of and demand for surface
water supplies. The effect of these rules is to treat the reuse of wastewater, or the alternative disposal of wastewater, as an additional appropriation of state water which requires authorization.
Notwithstanding the broad discretion afforded to the Texas Water
Commission with respect to the conservation and development of
state water, the commission's attempt to regulate the use of developed

123. See Tex. Water Comm'n, 10 Tex. Reg. 3472 (1985), renewed, 10 Tex. Reg. 4985
(1985) (emerg. rule affecting 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 303.154) (expired March 3, 1986).
124. See Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 9 Tex. Reg. 6054-55 (1984), adopted, 10 Tex. Reg. 858-59
(1985) (codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 303.154) (return and surplus waters); see also Tex.
Water Dev. Bd., 9 Tex. Reg. 6054 (1984), adopted, 10 Tex. Reg. 858 (1985) (codified at 31
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 301.71) (definition of "municipal use"); 11 Tex. Reg. 1172 (1986) (prop.
to be codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 297. 1) (definition of "municipal use").
125. See, e.g., Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 9 Tex. Reg. 6055 (1984), adopted, 10 Tex. Reg. 85859 (1985) (codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 303.155) ("persons using state water, including
effluent ....
); Tex. Water Comm'n, 10 Tex. Reg. 3472 (1985), renewed, 10 Tex. Reg. 4985
(1985) (emerg. rule affecting 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 303.155) (expired March 3, 1986); Tex.
Water Comm'n, 11 Tex. Reg. 1175 (1986) (prop. to be codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 297.46) (suppliers of water for irrigation).
126. See Tex. Water Dev. Bd., 9 Tex. Reg. 6055-56 (1984), adopted 10 Tex. Reg. 859
(1985) (codified at 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 341.140); Tex. Water Comm'n 10 Tex. Reg. 3747
(1985), renewed, 10 Tex. Reg. 4991 (1985) (emerg. rule affecting 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 338.140) (expired March 3, 1986). This provision is expected to be reissued as a proposed
new rule in the near future. Rule 341.140 remains effective until that time.
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water is suspect due to a myriad of unresolved jurisdictional and constitutional issues.
B.

Legal Considerationsin Regulating Use of Developed Water
1. Authority to Regulate

An administrative agency only has such powers as are expressly
granted to it by statute or as can be necessarily implied from the authority conferred or duties imposed.I27 An agency's jurisdiction and
the nature and extent of its powers must therefore be found within the
128
constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to the agency.
The rules regulating the use of developed water, valid only if they
implement the provisions of the Texas Constitution and laws of the
state relating to the use of state water, were originally adopted pursuant to sections 5.011, 5.131, and 5.132 of the Water Code. 129 No additional constitutional or statutory authority other than the general
authorization delineated by these sections can be cited.
The Water Code provides that the right to divert and use state
water may be acquired only by obtaining a permit from the Water
Commission. Once a permit is acquired, the right to use state water is
limited to the amount of water stated in the permit which is or can be
beneficially used for the purposes authorized. There is no provision in
the Water Code requiring the return of water which has been used but
not consumed as a result of such use. Perhaps even more important,
there is nothing in the Water Code providing for the reappropriation
of appropriated water.130The supreme court has in fact expressly rejected such a concept.
The fact that an agency has general supervision over a subject does
not give the agency jurisdiction over all controversies that may arise.
For instance, the Railroad Commission is charged with the responsibility of investigating all complaints against railroad companies and
with ensuring that all laws concerning railroads are enforced.' 3 1 Even
127. See Martinez v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 570 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
128. See Blount v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 677 S.W.2d 565, 574 (Tex. App.-Austin
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

129. See Tex. Water Comm'n, 10 Tex. Reg. 858 (1985) (codified at 31 TEX.

ADMIN.

§ 341.140).
130. See Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d

CODE

873, 880 (Tex. 1984).
131. See TEX. REV. CIV.

STAT. ANN.

art. 6448, § 11 (Vernon 1966).
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though railroad companies are required to keep grade crossings, roadways, and rights-of-way in proper condition for the travelling public, 1 32 the Railroad Commission lacks express or implied authority to
33
issue orders requiring railroads to maintain their rights-of-way.
Even though an agency may in fact be expressly empowered to act
with respect to a particular matter, the operational parameters of the
agency's statutory grant of authority may prevent the agency from
exercising its delegated powers with regard to other matters. Accordingly, notwithstanding the authority delegated to the Texas Water
Rights Commission by the Water Rights Adjudication Act of 1967,134
the Austin Court of Appeals in Nueces County Water Control and
Improvement District No. 3 v. Texas Water Rights Commission, 35
held that the commission could
not adjudicate a water right dispute
13 6
proceeding.
forfeiture
a
during
The Water Commission appears to have exceeded its statutory
grant of authority by promulgating its developed water regulations in
at least three respects. The expanded definition of state water and the
requirement that an appropriator return its effluent to the source of
supply conflicts with the legislative intent expressed in the Water
Code. Section 11.046 only requires an appropriator to return surplus
water when it is reasonably practicable to do so by gravity flow. 137
Water which has been used and processed by a municipality is not
surplus water but is used water, which is not required to be returned
to the source of supply. 38 State water loses its character as state
water and becomes subject to disposition by the appropriator after the
water is diverted and beneficially used for an authorized purpose,
when the permit does
not require used water to be returned to the
39
source of supply. 1
The imposition of water availability issues in water quality permit
132. See id. arts. 6320, 6327; see also Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Rodriguez, 288
S.W. 151, 152 (Tex. Comm'n App.-1926, judgmt adopted).
133. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 609
S.W.2d 641, 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
134. See Water Rights Adjudication Act, 1967, ch. 45, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 86 (codified
at TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.302 to -.341 (Vernon Supp. 1986)).
135. 481 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
136. See id. at 929.
137. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.046 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
138. See Halsell v. Texas Water Comm'n, 380 S.W.2d 1,7 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
139. See supra nn.24-27 and accompanying text.
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hearings necessarily conflicts with the water quality permit requirements expressed in chapter 26 of the Water Code. The Water Commission may refuse to grant permits to discharge wastes into state
water only if the commission finds that the issuance of the permit
would violate state or federal law or would interfere with the purpose
of chapter 26.140 The commission is not authorized to reject a waste
discharge permit if the method of discharge would impact downstream water availability."' The commission may prescribe in a
waste discharge permit the duration of the permit, the location of the
discharge point, the maximum quantity of waste that may be discharged, the character and quality of the waste, and any reporting
and monitoring requirements that the commission deems necessary. 14 2 Following usual rules of construction, therefore, the commission is not authorized to consider water availability issues when
reviewing waste discharge permit applications.
Other jurisdictional problems arise when the state attempts to regulate developed water, as when the Water Commission considers
downstream water use requirements when it reviews wastewater discharge permits. Assume for example that a large Texas city such as
San Antonio obtains its municipal water supply from groundwater
sources. The city has always discharged its treated sewage effluent
into a watercourse, but seeks to amend its discharge permit and sell its
effluent for irrigation. 43 Water Commission rules now require the
140. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.027 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (effective upon delegation to Texas of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit authority).
141. See, e.g., id. § 26.027 (issuance of permits and amendments for discharge of waste);
id. § 26.029 (conditions of permit issuance); id. § 26.030 (effect on recreational water).
142. See id. § 26.029.
143. Of the state's ten largest municipal users of ground waters eight discharge their efflu-

ent into a state watercourse.

City

Volume of GroundWater Pumped in 1983
(in acre feet)

Amount of
Discharge (in
million gallons
per day)

Amarillo

26,270

18.55 MGD

Beaumont

12,083

60.0 MGD

Bryan

10,790

2.5 MGD

El Paso

82,667

40 to 44 MGD

Receiver of
Discharge
Reused for
Irrigation &
Cooling
Hillebrandt
Bayou
Burton, Still &
Turkey Creeks
Rio Grande &

Franklin Canal
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commission to consider the effect of that discharge on downstream
water rights and, presumably, the commission could deny the amendment and require the city to continue to discharge into the watercourse. Although the state retains the ability to regulate the discharge
of effluent, including effluent originating from groundwater, the state
possesses limited authority to regulate groundwater use.", The
Water Commission thus would exceed its statutory authority by applying water availability criteria when it considers applications for
beneficial use of treated sewage effluent originating from groundwater.
2.

Lower Colorado River Authority v. Texas Department
of Water Resources 45-The Dilemma of
"Unappropriated" Water

While rights of downstream appropriators of effluent and other return flows have been protected in a few states, 4 6 such has not been
the case in Texas. Downstream appropriators are only entitled to
water under the first in time, first in right principle.'47 A reclaiming
Houston Ship
Channel
16.5 MGD
Reused for
Lubbock
9,018
Irrgation &
Cooling
11,586
3 MGD
Monahans
Midland
Draw 18 MGD
Irrigation
8,827,189
5.83 MGD
Monahans
Odessa
Draw
170,497
150 MGD
San Antonio
San Antonio
River
6.5 to 7 MGD
Guadalupe
Victoria
9,030
River
Compiled from waste discharge permits and annual water use reports submitted to the Texas
Water Commission pursuant to TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.031 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (on
file at Texas Water Commission).
144. Chapter 52 of the Water Code provides for the creation of underground water districts with powers to make and enforce rules providing for the conservation, preservation,
protection, and recharge of underground water reservoirs. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§§ 52.02 1, -. 101 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Private ownership rights of the owner of underground
water, however, are expressly recognized and may not be impaired. See id. § 52.002 (Vernon
1972).
145. 689 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1984).
146. See supra nn. 46-75 and accompanying text. Colorado is in the minority. Most
states recognize the rights of the developer.
Houston

201,975

147. See

TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

335 MGD

§ 11.027 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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city therefore would have to meet the senior's call, either by discharging the needed amount of water or by foregoing some or all of its
original diversion. Other water users would have to make claim
either under the Water Code's permit mechanism or by prescription.
As observed by the Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals in State
v. Hidalgo County Water Conservation and Improvement District No.
18,148 "[t]he Texas Water Appropriation Acts were primarily intended to apply to free flowing streams ....149 The permitting provisions in the Water Code have no logical application to developed
water. From a practical viewpoint, there is no significant market for
developed water if there is water available in natural supply. The
water user could obtain his own water right from the state. Yet, if
there is only developed water available, the Water Commission is
technically prevented from issuing permits to use that water.
The Water Commission only may issue permits to appropriate
water if it finds that there is unappropriated water available in the
source of supply. 50 The Texas Supreme Court defines unappropriated water as the amount of water remaining after taking into account
all existing uncancelled permits and certified filings valued at their
recorded level.' 5 ' The Water Commission is not authorized to consider the amount of return flows when it determines whether there is
unappropriated water under the supreme court's definition.
Theoretically, water development should be enhanced as investors
are able to tell with the greatest possible certainty whether there will
be a water supply available to them. To this end, the Texas Supreme
Court mandated that the Water Commission grant permits only when
there is unappropriated water in the supply as measured by the recorded or face value of all outstanding water rights.'5 2 Developed
water, however, already is accounted for in that calculation under
water rights representing the initial authority to appropriate water.
The supreme court held that no new permits can be issued under
these circumstances until existing water rights have been cancelled.' 5 3
Ownership rights in developed water cannot be cancelled under the
148. 433 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
149. Id. at 737.
150. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.134(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
151. See Lower Colorado River Auth. v. Texas Dep't of Water Resources, 689 S.W.2d
873, 874 (Tex. 1984).
152. See id. at 874.
153. See id. at 882.
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Texas forfeiture statutes. Implicit in the concept of developed water
is the premise that all requirements as to the initial appropriation of
water have been satisfied. The water right under which that appropriation was made cannot be cancelled as to quantity, or, in other words,
"vertically." Neither can the forfeiture statutes be interpreted to provide a "horizontal" cancellation procedure. Such a procedure would
be exercised on a claim that because the appropriator has not for
some time period made further use of its appropriated water, he has
forfeited the opportunity to do so as to all amounts of water diverted
by other downstream appropriators. The Texas statutes which provide for cancellation of water rights in whole or in part, are by their
terms applicable only when water authorized to be diverted under a
water right has not been put to beneficial use at any time during a tenyear period. 154 On the other hand, it is self evident in the concept of
reusing or successively using water that it already has been beneficially used.
A concept related to forfeiture is that of abandonment. Water
Code section 11.030 provides: "If any lawful appropriation or use of
state water is willfully abandoned during any three successive years,
the right to use the water is forfeited and the water is again subject to
appropriation." ' The intent to abandon is an essential element and
it must be shown by clear and satisfactory evidence. 56 As noted by
the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals:
Abandonment may be shown by circumstances but the circumstances
must disclose some definite act showing intention to abandon. The nonuse of a right is not sufficient of itself to show abandonment but if the
failure to use is long continued and unexplained, it gives rise to an inference of intention to abandon. 57
Although the word "use" may have broad application, in the context of state water, section 11.030 has pertinence only to the initial
diversion and beneficial use of water made under a water right. Abandonment has relevance to developed water only in the context of the
release of particular molecules of water in a given instance.' 5 8 South
154. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.173, -. 178 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
155. Id. § 11.030.

156. See City of Corpus Christi v. Nueces County Water Control & Improvement Dist.
No. 3, 540 S.W.2d 357, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
157. City of Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
158. See Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 90 P.2d 58, 62, 13 Cal. 2d 343, 350 (1939)
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Texas Water Co. v. Bieri presented an instance when the developer of
water did not offer evidence that drainage water was in any manner
under its control or in its possession, thus its claim to rights in that
water failed.' 59 There is no legal concept which recognizes or provides that the right to use reclaimed water in the future may be
abandoned.
The Texas Water Commission recently has taken the view that
Lower Colorado River Authority v. Texas Department of Water Resources has no application to temporary permits issued under Water
Code section 11.138, and, therefore, it can issue new time-limited permits for diversions from streams already fully appropriated on paper.'60 Under this concept, the commission could issue permits for a
term of years or perhaps perpetual permits based upon the amount of
developed water historically returned to the source of supply. Even
should such a view prevail, assertions of state authority over developed water cannot by-pass the admonition in Guelker that the water
governing authority lacks jurisdiction in this matter and lacks statutory authority to compel the discharge of used water into the source
of supply. 6'
It also is difficult to comprehend how a downstream appropriator
could claim returned wastewater by prescription. The fact that water
rights can be lost by prescription was acknowledged long ago by the
Texas Supreme Court. 162 It follows that ownership of water once diverted could similarly be lost. To constitute adverse possession sufficient to deprive an owner of legal title to his property, "[s]uch
possession must be continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period, and must be actual, notorious, distinct and hostile, and of such
("Past abandonment by defendant of certain water, as distinguished from a water right, has
not conferred upon plaintiffs any right to compel a like abandonment in the future."). The
court also drew a distinction between the right to end the use of water and the right to end the
release of excess water while the original use is continued.

159. See South Texas Water Co. v. Bieri, 247 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

160. Cf TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.138(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986). This section authorizes the Water Commission to issue temporary permits "for beneficial purposes to the extent
that they do not interfere with or adversely affect prior appropriations or vested rights on the
stream from which water is to be diverted under such temporary permits." Id. § 11.138(a).
Temporary permits may not be issued for a duration greater than three years and do not vest
in their holders a permanent right to the use of water. See id. §§ 11.138(d), (e).
161. See Guelker v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist. No. 6, 269 S.W.2d 551,
555 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
162. See Baker v. Brown, 55 Tex. 377, 379 (1881).
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character as to indicate unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership in the occupant."' 6 3 Each of these elements must be
6
present, and the adverse claimant must prove each unequivocally.'
Downstream dependency on return flow may be continuous and actual, and may indicate a claim of right, but it cannot be hostile if the
upstream appropriator has no duty to continue his discharge of used
water.
Water that is used with the permission of the owner, or the use of
excess water when not needed by him, is a mere license, is not adverse
or hostile, and is insufficient to create the basis of a prescriptive
right. 1 65 In Mud Creek Irrigation, Agricultural and Manufacturing
Co. v. Vivian, 166 the plaintiff did not acquire title by prescription because the defendants "could not have prevented or interrupted the use
of the water by plaintiff by any legal proceedings, because it in no
manner affected their rights."' 167 More recently, the Corpus Christi
Court of Civil Appeals adopted as a principal that "prescription does

not run upstream."

161

3. Retroactive Effect of Developed Water Rules
Article 1, section 16 of the Texas Constitution prohibits enactment
of any retroactive law or other law impairing the obligations of contracts. 169 A retroactive law is one which destroys or impairs existing
vested rights, creates new obligations, imposes new duties, or otherwise affects rights accruing prior to enactment of the statute."'7 The
courts' opinions with regard to retroactive statutes can be characterized as follows: the challenged statute is impermissible because it impairs a vested right, the statute impairs a vested right but a reasonable
time to protect the right was provided, or the statute, although retro163. Heard v. State, 146 Tex. 139, 141, 204 S.W.2d 344, 347-48 (1947).
164. See City of Corpus Christi v. Nueces County Water Improvement Dist. No. 3, 540
S.W.2d 357, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
165. See Motd v. Boyd, 116 Tex. 82, 126, 286 S.W. 458, 476 (1926).
166. 74 Tex. 170, 11 S.W. 1078 (1889).
167. Id. at 176, 11 S.W. at 1079; see also Houston Trans. Co. v. San Jacinto Rice Co., 163
S.W. 1023, 1025 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1914, no writ).
168. See City of Corpus Christi v. Nueces County Water Improvement Dist. No. 3, 540
S.W.2d 357, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
169. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
170. See Turbeville v. Gowdy, 272 S.W. 559, 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1925, no
writ).
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active, was remedial in nature or did not otherwise affect a vested
right.
The article I, section 16 protection against governmental actions
which impair the obligations of contracts is directed toward those
statutes which release a party from a duty imposed by an existing
or
contract, or otherwise results in a material change, modification, 17
impairment of the rights and obligations created by the contract. '

For example, the courts have declared invalid legislative enactments
which attempt to expand the coverage included in existing insurance

policies, 172 affect the redemption powers of bond holders, 7 3 create a

lien in favor of a hospital which provides services prior to the effective
date of the statute, 74 or apply an amended consumer75 credit protection statute to an existing consumer credit contract.1
Although a permit is considered to represent a usufructuary right, a
permit also can be characterized as a contractual arrangement between the state and the permittee. Mutual promises are made and
reciprocal rights and obligations are created. One such promise
which has historically been implicit in a permit authorizing the diversion and use of state water is that the appropriator acquires the right
of control over and use of his developed water. Although the state
may impose limitations upon that right when the permit is granted,
the state may not retroactively expand those limitations by impairing
or materially changing the contractual rights and obligations created
by the permit.
Although the United States Constitution only prohibits the enactment of ex post facto laws or laws which impair an existing contractual obligation, Texas bans any law which would have a deleterious
impact upon an existing vested right. A vested right is more than just
a property right, it may be any "well-founded" claim recognized or
secured by law, and the Texas Constitution protects public rights as

171. See Luter v. Hunter, 30 Tex. 689, 694-95 (1868); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16,
interpretive commentary (Vernon 1984).
172. See French v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 591 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Austin 1979, no writ).
173. See Norton v. Kelberg County, 149 Tex. 261, 263, 231 S.W.2d 716, 718 (1950).
174. See Heights Hosp., Inc. v. Patterson, 269 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1954, writ ref'd).

175. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Zapata, 605 S.W.2d 362, 364-65 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 615 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1981).
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well as private interests.17 6
Sometimes legislative action may apply retrospectively and affect
vested rights but still be considered a valid exercise of the state's
power. The fact that a statute operates to change conditions and legal
rights existing prior to the effective date of the statute is not necessarily unconstitutional, provided the affected parties were afforded a reasonable time to protect their interests. 1 7 Additionally, as noted by
the supreme court in Texas Water Rights Commission v. Wright, a
statute which provides for the forfeiture of vested rights will not be
unconstitutional if the holder of that right might reasonably expect
enforcement of conditions inherently attached to those rights. 78 An
important consideration in upholding or striking down a retroactive
statute is whether the bona fide intentions or reasonable expectations
of the contracting parties is defeated or effectuated. 179 The courts
have also recognized that article F, section 16 of the Texas Constitution does not bar all statutes which are retroactive in operation, if the
legislation does not impact a vested right,' 8 0 is remedial in nature,'8 '
82
or is a valid exercise of the state's police power.1
In measuring the effect of the rules regulating developed water, it is
clear that these rules act retrospectively and severely impact vested
rights, as well as impair existing contractual obligations between the
state and appropriator. Whether the right to use developed water is
based upon a usufructuary right or an ownership interest, an appro-

176. See Mellinger v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 45, 3 S.W. 249, 253 (1887).
177. See Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. 1971); Pecos

Mercantile Co. v. McKnight, 256 S.W. 933, 936 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1923, writ ref'd).
178. See Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 649 (Tex. 1971).
179. See id. at 649; see also Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 TEXAS L. REV.
409, 427 (1928).
180. See Coley v. Texas Dep't of Public Safety, 348 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1961, no writ) (license or permit to drive is a privilege and not vested right, thus
habitual offender law which considered traffic offenses that occurred prior to effective date of
statute not unconstitutional); Kissick v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708, 711
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (opportunity to play high school football and
potential college athletic scholarship are not vested rights).
181. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Richardelle, 528 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (relating to retroactivity of statute which raised age limit of

children whose parents are responsible for their tortuous acts); Slate v. Fort Worth, 193 S.W.
1143, 1144 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1917, no writ) (relating to statute granting cause of
action against municipal corporation).
182. See State Bd. of Registered Professional Eng'rs, 504 S.W.2d 606, 609 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (legislature has continuing right pursuant to its
police power to amend statutes regulating business corporations in Texas).
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priator's ability to use his developed water is a vested right, well
within the scope of interests protected by the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws. This is not to say that the right to developed water is beyond any governmental regulation. There is no doubt
that the right to use developed water is limited to beneficial and nonwasteful uses. Pursuant to its police power, the state may also regulate the use of developed water as necessary to protect the public interest. Such regulation should be reasonable, however, for an
appropriator may legitimately expect that rights of use, such as those
provided by the doctrine of developed water, apply throughout the
duration of his permit. Thus, the regulations which restrict the right
to use developed water cannot be applied to permits issued prior to
the date the rules were promulgated unless the permit at the time
issued specified otherwise.
The rules restricting the right of an appropriator to use his developed water cannot be said to be merely remedial in nature. A remedial statute is one enacted to afford a remedy, or to improve and
facilitate remedies already in existence, or one intended for the correction of defects, mistakes, and omissions in the civil institutions and
administrative policy of the State." 3 The cancellation statutes analyzed in Texas Water Rights Commission v. Wright, for example, were
considered to be remedial in nature because they were intended to
provide for enforcement of a condition inherently attached to water
rights. ' 4 A restriction on the right to use developed water is not such
a condition. Neither are the developed water regulations purely procedural in nature, such as statutes relating to judicial or administrative procedures. But even though procedural statutes may be
retroactive, they may not be given retrospective application if to do so
would destroy or impair rights that had become vested before the statute became effective. Thus, the recent regulations adopted by the
Texas Water Commission in regulating the use of developed water,
although ostensibly procedural in nature, significantly impair the
rights of the developer and raise serious constitutional issues.

183. See Pratt v. Story, 530 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ); Slate
v. City of Fort Worth, 193 S.W. 1143, 1144 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1917, no writ).
184. See Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 649-50 (Tex. 1971);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7519a (repealed 1971) (provisions relating to cancellation of a
permit for ten year non-beneficial use are now contained in TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§§ 11.171 to -.186 (Vernon Supp. 1986)).
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PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Historically, the public policy of Texas has been to encourage reuse
of return flow/developed water, in order to reduce the demand for
unappropriated state water and to preserve the quality of the environment. This policy was reaffirmed by the passage of House Bill 2
which emphasized conservation techniques to increase the recycling
and reuse of water. 85 The rules restricting the right to use developed
water, in addition to raising serious jurisdictional and constitutional
issues, contradict this public policy. Legislation was proposed, but
defeated during the 1985 legislative session, which would provide a
statutory basis for regulating reuse of developed water. This legislation would have also voided those portions of the Water Commission's rules which geek to equate return flow with unappropriated
water under circumstances where an appropriator seeks authorization
to use the water before it is abandoned into a watercourse.
Senate Bill 990 and House Bill 1749 were identical companion bills
which recognized that the reuse of developed water was consistent
with the need for maximum conservation of state water. Developed
water was defined as state water lawfully diverted and beneficially
used, but not consumed as a result of that use. The Water Commission would have been authorized to issue amendments to the water
rights of cities and other political subdivisions authorizing the reuse of
the original
developed water, with reuse to be considered a part of 86
1
water.
state
of
appropriation
new
water right and not a
Finally, the proposed legislation also would have authorized the
Water Commission to issue an amendment to the water right of a city,
town, or political subdivision to divert additional water from a watercourse or reservoir provided that developed water from these addi-7
tional diversions was returned to the watercourse or reservoir.1
Such an exchange of developed water for state water would not involve an additional appropriation of water or deplete the supply of
available unappropriated water where, as was required in the bills, the
additional diversions are equal to or less than the amount of devel-

185. Act of May 23, 1985, ch. 133, § 1.09, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 630, 635 (Vernon)
(codified at TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 1134 (Vernon Supp. 1986)). House Bill 2 became

effective upon passage in November, 1985 of the constitutional amendments which were proposed by Tex. H.R.J. 6, 69th Leg., 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. A-100 (Vernon).
186. See S.B. 990, § 1, 69th Leg. (1985); H.B. 1749, § 1, 69th Leg. (1985).
187. See S.B. 990, § 1, 69th Leg. (1985); H.B. 1749, § 1, 69th Leg. (1985).
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oped water returned to the watercourse or reservoir. In the past, the
Commission has recognized such exchanges of water when private
groundwater is added to the watercourse to offset the effect of diversions from the watercourse.
The concept of such exchanges has been recognized in other jurisdictions. In State v. American Fruit Growers, Inc., 88 the Supreme
Court of Washington held that where a riparian owner, entitled to use
seepage water, permitted it to augment flow in a creek, he may take an
equal amount of water at a point higher up the creek provided he did
not interfere with the rights of others.' 89 The court reasoned that it
would be just and equitable to allow him to take an equal amount of
water from the creek at a point from which it can be taken by gravity,
rather than requiring him to take the seepage developed waters at the
point they enter the creek and pump them back up to his land by
mechanical means at a great expense.' 90
V.

CONCLUSION

The concept of developed water emphasizes the conservation of the
state's water resources and the enhancement of water quality. The
state in administering its water resources is under a constitutional
duty to conserve water as a precious resource, but administrative rules
which discourage water reuse will not further such conservation. The
Texas Water Commission should be allowed to regulate the use and
manner of disposal of developed water, but these rules should not impair or destroy vested rights to use developed water.

188. 237 P. 498 (Wash. 1925).
189. See id. at 500.
190. See id. at 500.
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